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Introduction
There has been increasing concern amongst academics and in public opinion about the dwindling of labour market opportunities for young workers across Europe. Figures from Eurostat (2013) showed that by the end of 2013 in EU28 youth unemployment had reached over 23%. In some EU countries, such as Italy, which is the focus of this paper, the plight of young people is even more worrying. The unemployment rate is almost twice the 2013
European figure, reaching 40% amongst those aged 15-24. The 25-29 employment rate in 2012 was 57.3% against 71.1% in the EU28, and the Not in Education, Employment and Training (NEET) rate was 23.9% in contrast with a EU28 value of 15.8%.
In such a state of affairs, commentators started to refer to the recent generation as génération sacrifiée, zero generation, postponed generation, the "1000 euro" generation and the Status Zero Youth. The UK press (Financial Times, Nov. 2013) refers to them as the "lost generation", due to their sharp fall in earnings starting from their early career, compared to their pre-crisis counterparts at the same stage.
The sociological literature has extensively studied the conditions of the young generations along several dimensions, i.e. educational attainments, occupational paths, social mobility, life courses and transitions to adulthood (e.g. see Blossfeld et al. 2005 and for cross countries comparisons, Schizzerotto et al. 2011 for the Italian case). The literature on occupational paths focuses mainly on labour market entry, in terms of first job search duration, the quality of the first job, and the early career path, assessed in terms of unemployment risks and transitions among different contractual arrangements . However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the studies has explored labour incomes trends across generations.
The economic literature, on the other hand, has devoted limited but growing attention to analysis of earnings patterns across generations in some OECD countries. Beaudry and Green (2000) and Beach and Finnie (2004) find a declining entry wage for those who entered the labour market during the '90s in Canada (by 10-15%) in contrast with steady upward shifts in the earnings profiles for the '60s and '70s cohorts. In Germany the picture is quite different: the earnings of the young cohorts grew at the same rate as those of other cohorts over the period 1976 -1984 (Fitzenberger et al. 2001 .
Another stream of the literature explored the dynamics in earnings across generations to understand changes in inequality over time. Gosling et al. (2000) show that one third of the overall rise in wage dispersion in the period in the UK is due to a drop in median wages of successive cohorts entering the labour market. For the US, Card and Lemieux (2001) reveal that the increase in inequality might be at least partially accounted for by a cohort effect: over the period 1956-1995 wage skill premia increased, but substantially more for men in their early thirties (it doubled) than for older men.
As for Italy, Torrini (2007 and 2013) offer preliminary evidence on the deterioration of entry wages over the '90s compared to older generations. Using administrative data, they find that younger generations experience a permanent loss in their working life earnings due to a lower entry wage, which is not offset by a faster career. 1 The main contribution to the literature offered by our paper is to show that in Italy the deterioration of the earnings dynamics in the early phase of the career has not been homogenous across skill levels. The previous literature either finds no significant heterogeneity among differently skilled workers or simply fails to investigate the heterogeneity across skills. In Germany the wages of young workers with intermediate education levels deteriorated slightly compared to those of both high and low educational levels (Fitzenberger et al. 2001) . In the US a loss of earnings power among younger non-college educated workers -compared to their previous counterparts -is documented by Mishel (2012) , while in Canada no differences in the earnings patterns of upper secondary and tertiary educated workers emerged (Beadry and Green 2000) . 2 We make use of a very rich panel dataset, AD-SILC, recently built merging information from : 1965-1969, 1970-1974 and 1975-1979 . We follow their working careers from the year of labour market entry to their 6 th year of labour market experience. We then observe the individual earnings path in the period 1980-2009, up We estimate a simple model to identify the components of annual earnings dynamics that are cohort specific and experience specific, while controlling for workers characteristics (e.g.
gender, education, region of work) and for business cycle (proxied by GDP growth and regional unemployment rates). In this way we obtain an estimate of the average wage profile in the first six years of their career for workers belonging to different cohorts.
We use two different measures of skills. First, we take into account educational levels. Second, we perform unconditional quantile regressions: unskilled, median skilled and skilled workers are identified as those individuals belonging, respectively, to the 10 th , 50 th and 90 th percentile of the unconditional earnings distribution.
Our study highlights a deterioration of the earnings dynamics in the early phase of the career for the most recent cohorts compared to the older ones, and it reveals that the high skilled workers are particularly penalized.
More in detail, the OLS estimates by educational levels show that the cumulative earnings difference between the youngest and the oldest cohort of tertiary graduates in the first six years of their working life amounts to around € 35,500. These differences are lower for upper secondary educated workers, accounting for € 16,600, and are much more limited (€ 2,800) for those with at most a lower secondary degree. Interestingly, we obtain very similar findings when using unconditional quantile regressions as proxy for skills.
Unlike previous studies for Italy and for other countries, and in contrast with the expectations suggested by the skill-biased literature (Katz and Autor 1999) , our results show, surprisingly, that the Italian "best of youth", i.e. the best workers of the most recent cohorts (the high skilled), have suffered, compared to the previous cohorts, an earnings penalty much heavier than experienced by the unskilled workers. 
The Italian framework
As pointed out in the introduction, Eurostat data suggest that the prospects of young generations seem to be very worrying as far as Italy is concerned. It is important to note that the low youth employment rates cannot be attributed to high university enrolment rates: Italy is in fact characterized by the highest share of NEET in the EU (after Greece and Bulgaria). In addition, even though the share of the young population enrolled in tertiary education in Italy is no higher than the EU average, Italians start work relatively later: the majority start work at the age of 23, while in most of the other countries the usual entry age is 20 (Eurostat 2009). 4 Italy has also been characterized by an almost flat trend in mean real earnings associated with very slow productivity growth rates. 5 On average, private employees' real earnings remained substantially constant since 1995, after a steady increase during the '80s and a sudden decline due to the 1992-1993 economic downturn (Raitano 2012) . Moreover, analysing the earnings patterns in Italy over the last decades, two main set of institutional changes need to be taken into account.
First, in order to stop the wage-price spiral, the automatic indexation mechanism (the scala mobile) was weakened in 1984 and finally abolished in 1992. Subsequently, a new agreement among the social partners on wage bargaining (the 23rd of July 1993 Protocol) established that the renewal of national collective contracts had to refer to the programmed inflation rate rather than to the expected inflation rate.
Second, since 1997 the Italian labour market has been characterized by a series of institutional changes. 6 After the occupational crisis of the early '90s, a series of reforms (the main ones phased in 1997, 2001, 2003) has been put forward with the aim of reducing labour market rigidity, often considered one of the main causes of the high unemployment rates (OECD 1994) . These reforms introduced several new types of flexible contractual arrangements, thus increasing the probability to hire employees through fixed-term and atypical arrangements.
The process of labour market deregulation has been defined "partial and targeted" (Esping 4 Although educational attainments have increased in Italy over the last few decades, the share of tertiary graduated among the workers aged 25-64 is currently still much lower than the EU28 average (19.4% versus 34%; Eurostat data) while the share of those having at most a lower secondary degree is much higher (34.2% as against 21.7%). 5 As reported by the OECD, in Italy the average annual labour productivity growth rate amounted to 0.2% in the period 1997-2008 (0.9% in the Euro area), while it amounted to 2.0% in the period 1986-1996 in Italy. 6 For a detailed description of the Italian labour market reforms see Berton et al. (2012). in the labour market (Blanchard and Landier 2002) . As argued by Barbieri and Scherer (2009) , labour market flexibilization engendered negative consequences for the young generations, in terms of both employment stability and welfare guarantees.
Dataset
Analysis of earnings trends across cohorts requires the use of long panel dataset. The evolution of the earnings distribution in Italy has been studied mainly using microdata On the one hand, with the administrative sources it is possible to reconstruct for each individual the time of labour market entry, the effective labour market experience and annual earnings, and other important covariates such as the region of work, gender, age and information on contractual arrangement (i.e. part-time versus full-time). 7 On the other hand, through matching with the survey data we can add information on educational attainment using three dummy variables indicating the highest degree achieved: at most lower secondary (ISCED 1-2), upper secondary (ISCED 3) and tertiary or post-secondary (ISCED 4-6).
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We use AD-SILC data to assess the evolution of the earnings patterns in the beginning phase of working careers. More in detail, we group individuals according to their birth year in 3
cohorts -1965-1969 , 1970-1974 and 1975-1979 -and we follow their working careers from labour market entry year up to the end of their 6 th year of labour market experience. 8 We then observe the individual earnings paths in the period 1980-2009.
Our main variable of interest is earnings from private employment. 9 More in detail, we analyze the trend of private employees' annual real gross earnings in Euros (annual earnings have been converted to 2010 constant prices using the consumer price index). 10 The reason why we restrict our attention to private employee's earnings is twofold: i) self-employed incomes are plagued by huge problems of underreporting and truncation in the administrative archives; ii) earnings of public employees, parasubordinate workers and professionals have been available only since 1996.
Hence, the final sample comprises 35,904 observations concerning 7,504 private employees born in the period 1965-1979.
Empirical strategy
We begin with an accurate analysis of the descriptive evidence (section 6.1), and proceed by means of two methodologies: i) estimating mean earnings profiles through OLS regressions (sections 6.2 and 6.3); ii) estimating the trends at different points in the earnings distribution using unconditional quantile regressions (section 6.4).
The results are presented mainly through figures, which more effectively summarize the descriptive and estimated trends in the first 6 years of the working career. Furthermore, the tables show the values at entry and the sixth year of working career together with some related summary measures of the earnings differences across cohorts. 11
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The descriptive evidence refers to sample means of the gross annual earnings of private employees computed -separately for the three cohorts -in the six working years following the entry year, also distinguishing workers according to their level of education.
However, descriptive plots should be taken with caution for two main reasons. First, they do not take into account change in the labour force composition over time, e.g. change in individual characteristics such as increase in educational attainment and female participation.
Second, they do not account for business cycle effects on the patterns characterizing different cohorts at different seniorities (i.e. years of experience) in the labour market. Thus, in the second step of our empirical analysis, we move to estimate, through OLS, average earnings profiles to take into account both individual observed heterogeneity and business cycle.
In order to estimate mean earnings dynamics, our baseline model is as follows:
where stands for our dependent variables, individual annual (log) earnings (where i is the individual, j the birth cohort and t the year). The time earning dynamics is captured using for each cohort an intercept for the entry level and a trend for the first six years of career. Hence we include as covariates the three birth cohort dummies, to allow for different intercepts, and the interaction terms between the three cohort dummies and the labour market experience (see equation 1). In order to capture possible non-linearities we make use of the third degree polynomial in labour market experience. Therefore, estimated mean earnings along the first six years of the working life are computed for each cohort adding the predicted value of the third grade polynomial to the cohort specific coefficient.
A wide set of control variables Xit is included: individual characteristics -gender, education and work region dummies -and proxies of the business cycle, i.e. the GDP real growth rate in the previous year and the current regional (NUTS-2) unemployment rates, both included through a third-order polynomial.
We also investigate whether the results are affected by unemployment spells during the year by running OLS regressions using as dependent variable the logarithm of weekly wages (computed dividing annual private employment earnings by the number of weeks worked as a private employee during the year) and including among the covariates a dummy variable for part-time jobs, which has been proved to affect unemployment risks (Booth et al. 2002) .
As a further robustness check, we change our baseline model considering as dependent variable the ratio between the individual annual gross earnings and the mean annual earnings of prime-age private employees (i.e. those aged 35-44 in the full AD-SILC sample), with the aim of further depurating patterns specific to the first phase of the career from trends common to all private employees. Moreover, we investigate trends by gender and parental background.
One of the main original contributions offered by the paper consists in carrying out our analysis by education level. An alternative way of capturing possible heterogeneity in skills is to estimate unconditional quantile regressions, as proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) . By using this methodology it is possible to estimate a given percentile of an unconditional distribution of earnings applying the same specification used with OLS for average wages. 
In its simplest form, the conditional expectation of the 
where the parameters can be estimated by OLS. The parameter can be any distributional parameters, such as the Gini index, the variance or the percentiles of the wage distribution.
Extension to the percentiles of the wage distribution was proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) . In such a way it is possible to write the percentile of distribution as a function of the set of covariates (
), thus isolating the contribution of the variables we are interested in (cohort and labour market experience), as we did for average wages.
It is worth stressing the importance of using unconditional quantile regressions instead of the standard conditional quantile regressions (Koenker and Basset 1978) : when using conditional quantile regressions, for instance at the median, the estimates refer to the median of the "error term", whereas by using unconditional median quantile regressions it is possible to recover the impact of the covariates on the median of the unconditional distribution, which is what we are interested in.
From the practical point of view, we estimate by OLS the RIF regressions for the 10 th , 25 th , 50 th , 75 th and 90 th percentiles of the yearly private employees logarithms of gross annual earnings on the same set of covariates used in the baseline model when estimating average earnings. In this way we can isolate the contribution of the different cohorts and of the labour market experience in the first 6 years of workers' careers.
Empirical findings

Descriptive Evidence
This section offers a descriptive picture of the average "raw" earnings experience profiles for the whole sample of individuals and by educational levels. Figure 1A shows for each cohort the entry earning and the experience profile during the first six years of the working career. As mentioned, entry earnings are computed at the second year of experience, since in the first year individuals enter the labour market at different times.
From Figure 1A The picture becomes further worrisome when considering the differences in the generation gaps by educational attainments (Figures 1B-1D ). At the level of those attaining at most a lower secondary degree, the differences across cohorts are almost negligible, especially at the end of the observation period ( Figure 1B ). On the contrary, when considering individuals with upper secondary and tertiary education ( Figure 1C and 1D, respectively), the last two cohorts are clearly characterized by the worst entry earnings and experience profiles. With regard to the upper secondary educated, the earnings profiles are parallel, but the absolute levels steadily decline across cohorts. As for graduates, the differences between the 1965-1969 cohort and the two following cohorts widen along the first part of the working career. Considering the first six years of experience, the cumulated earnings of the two youngest cohorts are around 13% (17,000 Euros) lower than the earnings of the oldest cohort (Table 1 ) Table 1 here
OLS estimates
To control for the changing composition of the labour force and for the business cycle, we resort to a regression framework. Figures 2A-2D show the estimated trends relative only to the cohort and experience variables, obtained using OLS estimates of the baseline model (see A preliminary look at the graphs confirms the evidence of the descriptive analysis: the youngest generations are worse off, and this is particularly evident among the high skilled.
From Figure 2A and Table 2 it emerges that, on controlling for business cycle and individual characteristics, the entry earnings of the youngest cohort (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) are 11% lower than those of the oldest cohort (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) . The trends across cohorts along the experience profile are then quite similar to those of the entry earnings, the lines being basically parallel to one another, especially for the oldest and the youngest cohort. When we consider the "cumulated" differences across cohorts of the total earnings along the six years of experience, it emerges that the second and third cohorts have lost, respectively, € 4,866 and € 8,133 compared to the first one (Table 2 ). This cumulative difference is substantial, considering, for instance, that the average entry earning for an individual of the youngest cohort is around € 13,000.
Figures 2A-2D here
We now focus attention on the predicted trends for individuals with different educational attainments ( Figures 2B-2D and Table 2 ). As for the unskilled workers, i.e. those with at most lower secondary education, the entry earning of the youngest cohort is 6.4% lower than that of the oldest cohort. These differences dwindle along the experience profiles, ending up with very similar earnings at the sixth year of experience. The fact that the curves get closer implies that the cumulative differences across cohorts are smaller for unskilled individuals; indeed, the total loss for the second and third cohort amounts to € 2,076 and € 2,800, respectively (Table 2 ). profiles entail substantial cumulative differences with respect to the oldest cohort, respectively amounting to € 9,100 for the second cohort and to € 16,743 for the youngest cohort. This is quite striking if we take into account the fact that the entry earnings for an individual with upper secondary education in the youngest cohort come to € 13,500.
As for tertiary educated individuals, the differences are even wider. Figure 2D and Table 2 reveal that the entry earnings of the youngest cohort is 21% lower than that of the oldest cohort, and that these differences show even greater increase by the end of the experience profile. Interestingly, among tertiary graduates the second cohort profile comes closer to that of the youngest than to the oldest cohort. These significant gaps produce cumulative differences across cohorts that are striking, as the total losses in the first six years of career amount to € 28,973 for the intermediate cohort and € 35,534 for the youngest (Table 2 ). Since the average entry earnings for a graduate in the youngest cohort come to € 17,750, this means that the cumulated loss in the first part of the working career amounts to twice the entry yearly earnings.
Table 2 here
For additional evidence of the relative decline in the earning-power of skilled workers in the youngest cohorts, we can compute educational wage premia through an OLS regression on both (logs of) annual and weekly earnings, with standard Mincerian controls. 13 Educational wage premia largely decrease for those born in the '70s, especially when annual earnings are considered ( Figure 3) : indeed, the yearly earnings premia for tertiary graduates decrease from 58.1% for the oldest cohort to 35.9% for the youngest. 13 The control variables are: gender, a third order polynomial on labour market experience, the three dummies on education (at most lower secondary is the omitted category) and year and region of work dummies. Consistently, Naticchioni et al. (2010) , using a different dataset, show falling education wage premia for Italy through both OLS and conditional quantile regressions. 
Further specifications
For preliminary robustness verification we make use of the weekly gross real wages instead of the yearly gross real earnings. This is important since penalties in yearly earnings for the younger cohorts might depend on different degrees of labour market attachment, in terms of both weeks worked per year and hours worked per week. In turn, labour market attachment might depend on labour markets reforms that have mostly affected the youngest cohorts in our data. To address this issue we simply use as dependent variable the weekly wage (computed dividing the annual earnings by the weeks worked) instead of the yearly earnings.
We include among the regressors a dummy for part-timers (hours worked per week are not available in the AD-SILC dataset; thus it is not possible to compute hourly wages). Figure 4A shows the career profile for different cohorts. The results are basically confirmed:
younger cohorts have lower entry wages and the differences remain basically constant along the first years of career. A point to note is that the penalty for the cohorts born in the '70s is lower when observing weekly wages than when using yearly earnings (respectively, 6.1% versus 11.2% at the entry, 7.0% versus 7.7% in the sixth year; see Tables 2 and 3 ). This suggests that part of the results obtained for yearly earnings are due to differences in attachment to the labour market of different cohorts. 14 In any case, a substantial penalty is still there.
When we split the sample according to education level (Figures 4B-4D and Table 3 ), it emerges that the entry wage penalty for the youngest cohort is still substantial, and slightly increasing over education levels, ranging from 7.8% for workers with at most a lower secondary degree, to 10.9% and 10.7% for workers with upper secondary and tertiary education, respectively. By contrast, the differences observed in the last year (the sixth) grow considerably with education level. For unskilled workers the drop of the youngest cohort compared to the oldest one in the final year amounts to 4.1%, while for workers with upper secondary and tertiary education the drop increases substantially up to around 9.5%, even if it is lower than the gap estimated using yearly earnings as dependent variable (see Tables 2 and 3 ).
This evidence suggests that the deterioration for the youngest cohorts of tertiary graduates does not occur along the remuneration dimension alone, but also in attachment to the labour market, in terms of weeks worked per year and hours worked per week. Indeed, our data show that the average working weeks per year of tertiary graduates decreased from 49.9 for those belonging to the oldest cohort to 47.6 and 47.0 for those belonging to the cohorts 1970-1974 and 1975-1979 , respectively.
Figures 4A-4D here Table 3 here
However, a possible limitation to our estimates is that the trends observed could be associated not only with young individuals but with all workers in different cohorts. Basically, it would mean that our specification is not effective in fully controlling for the business cycle, even if it includes GDP growth and regional unemployment polynomials. To respond to this possible critique we derive a new dependent variable, computed as the ratio between the annual gross earnings of young individuals divided by the annual gross earnings of prime-age workers, aged 35-44. In this way we are sure to cancel out all issues related to business cycles, since the new dependent variable is a ratio and the business cycle hits numerator and denominator at the same time.
Also using this "relative earnings" variable our findings are confirmed (Table 4) . For all individuals, the entry "relative" earning penalty for the youngest cohort comes to 6.1%.
Furthermore, it is increasing along the education levels, amounting to 4.3% for at most lower secondary educated, 6.7% for upper secondary educated workers and 8.7% for tertiary graduated workers. Differences are also persistent along the first six years of the career, becoming particularly notable for workers with tertiary education. Thus the similarities of the results obtained through the baseline specification and the regression on relative earnings between young and prime-age workers clearly confirm that the baseline specification controls appropriately for the business cycle.
Table 4 here
We also carry out two further specifications in which we investigate differences across cohorts by gender and by parental background for the whole sample (controlling for their education; Table 5 ).
The gender breakdown confirms that both young males and females are affected by the deterioration in earnings across cohorts. A significant point here is that males suffer a substantially greater penalty between the oldest and the youngest cohort, both in the first and in the sixth year of career. Using the cumulate differences, males show a penalty of € 10,296 with respect to € 4,854 for women.
Distinguishing individuals by parental background (proxied by the highest educational attainment of father or mother recorded in IT-SILC 2005 and coded according to the same three levels considered so far) could prove interesting, as recent studies show that in Italy, in addition to a significant influence on children education, a better background is associated with higher earnings for prime-age workers, even when controlling for the children's education (Franzini and Raitano 2009 ). Table 5 shows that for all levels of parental background the youngest cohort has reduced earnings as compared with the oldest cohort, suggesting that a better parental background does not help mitigate earnings deterioration. Interestingly, the cumulate difference is highest for individuals with a parental background coming midway, while the earning gaps are similar among the children of high and low educated parents.
Tables 5 here
A different proxy of skills: RIF estimates of earnings percentiles
As noted in section 4, unconditional quantile regressions provide an alternative way to capture differences in skills across individuals, i.e. individuals located at different percentiles of the unconditional annual earnings distribution. As for the OLS regressions, the unconditional quantile regressions include cohort dummies, a third polynomial in labour market experience, education, gender, regional dummies, third polynomial in unemployment rate and in national GDP growth. Figure 5A -5C provides the estimated trends of the 10 th , 50 th and 90 th percentiles, using the coefficients for cohort dummies and experience. Interestingly, for the 10 th percentile of the distribution (Figure 5A ), the yearly entry earnings are fairly stable across cohorts, as well as the experience profile. This confirms that for unskilled workers there are no differences across cohorts, i.e. individuals belonging to the most recent cohorts have not been penalized. 15 Note that the trend of the experience profiles of the 25 th and 75 th percentiles are similar to the trend of the 10 th percentile and 90 th percentiles, respectively. Detailed results are available upon request.
Differences across cohorts begin to emerge at median earnings ( Figure 5B ), since, compared to the first cohort, the most recent cohorts display much lower entry earnings (around 15%), with the second cohort in an intermediate position. Such differences diminish along the experience profile, although the curves never cross. When considering the cumulative differences along the six years of experience it turns out that the two youngest cohorts display a substantial gap compared to the oldest one, respectively € 6,413 and € 11,231; Table 6 ).
At the 90 th percentile ( Figure 5C ), the differences across cohorts are very considerable both at the beginning of the career and along the experience path, entailing a cumulative gap of the second and third cohort with respect to the first amounting to € 18,656 and € 35,637, respectively (Table 6 ). 16 The latter figure is indeed striking, especially when considering that the entry yearly earnings of an individual of the last cohort at the 90 th percentile is around € 20,300: the cumulative loss in six year is, then, 1.75 times the entry earnings. Note also that the cumulative difference at the 90 th percentile is basically the same as the one derived for tertiary graduates. Thus the evidence using unconditional quantile regressions shows that considering a different measure of skills, i.e. the percentile of the unconditional distribution of wages, generates patterns across cohorts that are quite similar to those obtained by using the levels of education, confirming the appreciable robustness of our interpretation in terms of skills .
Figures 5A-5C here Table 6 here 6.
Discussion and conclusions
Our findings show that the labour market conditions of young workers have deteriorated across cohorts in Italy, consistently with previous papers in the literature for other countries.
The original contribution of our paper lies in the finding that the deterioration across cohorts is much more marked for skilled individuals, i.e. it is "the best of youth" that have suffered the most. An interesting additional remark concerns the fact that due to some data limitations, in this paper we focus on employees only. As we have seen, the parasubordinate arrangements introduced by the labour market reforms of the '90s are usually characterized by low wages and high unemployment risks, mainly for the tertiary graduated. Hence, the labour market 16 Note that the slope of the experience profiles decreases along the earning distribution. This is mainly due to the fact that the entry earnings across percentiles differ (while in the graph they are set at one for all percentiles), being much greater in the upper tail of the earnings distribution. For instance, for the youngest cohort the entry annual gross earnings at the 10 th percentile, at the median, and at the 90 th percentile come to € 4,360, € 12,320 and € 20,300 respectively. performance of the high skilled in the youngest cohorts is likely to be worse than appears in this paper.
What explanation could there be for this deterioration for the youngest cohort, and especially for skilled individuals?
One possible explanation could emerge from standard supply and demand considerations. In the last few decades educational attainment has shown a general increase in Italy, as in all countries. For instance, the share of graduates has increased from around 5% in the eighties to almost 15% in recent years. Given this state of affairs, one might argue that the deterioration for the youngest cohort has been worse for the high skilled since these workers have become far less scarce in the economy. Or to put it another way, in accordance with the skill biased technological change literature, it could be argued that the demand for skills in Italy has increased at a lower rate with respect to the supply, thereby determining a reduction in wages for young skilled workers. This is a possible explanation, but it needs stressing that Italy is a country where educational levels are very low with respect to other European and OECD countries, and catching up only very slowly. Arguing that there is simply too much higher education in Italy would also imply that the Italian production system has some peculiar features to the effect that the demand for skills is much lower than in other European/OECD countries.
Another possible explanation lies in the institutional changes that have occurred in the last few decades in Italy, where a partial and targeted labour market deregulation process has been underway (Esping Andersen and Regini 2000) . The hypothesis that an increase in flexibility could have entailed a reduction in bargaining power for young individuals is perfectly reasonable and plausible, since new temporary contracts introduced by the reforms have been used mainly for young people. Another important step in this explanation is to understand why the decrease in bargaining power has been greater for skilled individuals.
This might be accounted for with the fact that new forms of temporary contracts have been used for graduates on a very large scale (Barbieri and Scherer 2009) , and this in turn could have been due to a difficulty for Italian labour demand to absorb the increasing share of graduates on regular contracts, associated with higher wages.
Finally, it might also be a matter of the quality of education. The Italian university system was reformed in the nineties, and one might argue that the quality of skilled individuals declined over time, thus accounting for the reduction of wages for recent cohorts as well as the fall in educational wage premia.
Identification of all the factors at work behind our results is far beyond the goal of this paper, also because it would require different data for different explanations. This will be the focus of future research. 
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